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If this conference had been held in the year 2000, it would hardly have 
been worth anyone’s while coming to it in order to discuss the English 
approach to punitive damages.1  Although there has always been an 
 
 *  Andrew Tettenborn is Bracton Professor of Law at the University of Exeter, England.  He has previously taught at (among others) the University of Cambridge, the University of Melbourne, Australia, and the University of Connecticut.  He specializes in obligations and remedies, in which he has published extensively, and has recently brought out a major work on the law of damages in England.  1. I purposely refer to the English, rather than United Kingdom, position.  Scots law is different from English, being in origin an uncodified civil law system.  Its position on punitive damages can be stated succinctly: it does not allow them, period.  See 2 DAVID M. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 160 (3d ed. 1982).  I should add, for the sake of completeness, that the law of Northern Ireland, the third component of the United Kingdom, can be regarded as the same as that of England. 
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undoubted jurisdiction to award them, for nearly forty years after the 
House of Lords gave judgment in Rookes v. Barnard,2 they had 
languished in a recondite backwater of the law.  Far from being encouraged 
as “an integral part of the common law tradition and the judicial arsenal,”3 
they were regarded as a regrettable anomaly, grudgingly allowed only in 
very limited circumstances which openly owed everything to history and 
nothing to logic.  The position was, in short, one almost unrecognizable 
to lawyers from most U.S. jurisdictions—and, for that matter, those from 
most Commonwealth countries too.  Not surprisingly, it greatly troubled 
the English Law Commission when it reported on the matter in 1997.4  
However, the landmark 2001 decision of the House of Lords in Kuddus 
v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary,5 which came after the 
Law Commission report just referred to,6 has now removed much of the 
previous sclerosis.  As a result there is now everything to play for, and a 
golden opportunity for academics and others to say where we should go 
from here. 
I.  HISTORY 
For the benefit of those not familiar with English damages law, a brief 
history is appropriate. 
Until 1963 the position in England regarding the availability of 
punitive damages would not have been too unfamiliar to an American 
observer.  Although it was accepted that there could be no punitive 
damages in contract, in tort there were no particular limitations on their 
award.  So in the first edition of Winfield on Tort, published in 1937, the 
author pithily stated: “In exemplary damages7 [the court] can punish the 
defendant for misbehaviour.  These represent the jury’s indignation at an 
especially outrageous attack on the plaintiff’s security, or at wanton 
misconduct on the defendant’s part.”8  Most of the pre-1963 cases 
concerned trespass9 and assault,10 but there were also instances of awards 
 
 2. [1964] A.C. 1129, 1163 (H.L.).  3. The phrase is Judge Beam’s.  Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 745 (8th Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).  4. LAW COMM’N, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES 247, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES].  5. [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L. 2001). 
 6. See AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, at 93–182.  7. In English usage exemplary and punitive damages are the same thing.  “Exemplary” is the more traditional term, but the Law Commission preferred “punitive,” and so do I in this Article.  8. P.H. WINFIELD, A TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT 153 (1st ed. 1937).  9. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99 (K.B. 1763); see also Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774) (awarding £500 for unlawful customs search); 
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for nuisance,11 false imprisonment,12 libel,13 and malicious prosecution.14  
Significantly, the only constraint was the need for some outrageous or 
wanton conduct by the defendant. 
However, in 1963 came the decision in Rookes v. Barnard.15  Leaders 
of a labor union threatened a strike in a successful attempt to persuade 
an employer to fire nonunion labor.  They were held liable to one of the 
nonunionists in the tort of intimidation.  The jurors trying the case were 
charged that if they found the defendants’ conduct towards the plaintiff 
sufficiently egregious they could award punitive damages against them, 
and they duly did so.  On appeal, the House of Lords reversed.  Lord 
Devlin, giving the leading opinion, laid down the following principles.  
First, punitive damages were an anomaly, in that they not only injected 
an inappropriate penal element into the civil law but also imposed a 
penalty on the defendant without the due process safeguards inherent in 
the criminal law.16  Secondly, even where they were available in respect 
of a given tort they should be given only in two cases: (a) where there 
was deliberate malpractice by a public officer or authority, or (b) where 
a tort was committed with the deliberate intent that the profits from it 
would exceed any compensatory damages payable.17  In Rookes itself, 
the plaintiff’s claim therefore failed, since the defendant was not a public 
authority and clearly there had been no intent to profit from the tort.  In a 
subsequent decision of the House of Lords, Cassell & Co. v. Broome,18 a 
further limitation was suggested by two Law Lords,19 and later accepted 
as representing the law:20 because Rookes had been intended to halt any 
 
Loudon v. Ryder, [1953] 2 Q.B. 202, 203 (Eng. C.A.) (involving forcible eviction by lessor: £3000 awarded over and above £2500 for assault and trespass).  10. See, for example, the early political cases of Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763) (concerning wrongful arrest), and Benson v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766) (involving a common soldier flogged to satisfy an officer’s 
amour propre).  11. Bell v. Midland Ry. Co., 142 Eng. Rep. 462, 463 (C.P. 1861). 
 12. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.  13. Ley v. Hamilton, 153 L.T.R. 384 (H.L. 1935).  14. Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (K.B. 1779).  15. [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.). 
 16. Id. at 1230 (“I do not care for the idea that in matters criminal an aggrieved party should be given an option to inflict for his own benefit punishment by a method which denies to the offender the protection of the criminal law.”). 
 17. Id. at 1226–27.  Lord Devlin added a third, namely where statute specifically authorized such damages, but today it seems that no statute does, so this is an empty set.  18. [1972] A.C. 1027 (H.L.). 
 19. Id. at 1076 (Lord Hailsham); id. at 1131 (Lord Diplock). 
 20. See A.B. v. S. W. Water Servs. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 507, 523 (Eng. C.A. 1992). 
TETTENBORN.DOC 8/21/2019  1:33 PM 
 
1554 
future expansion of punitive damages, they could not be given in respect 
of any tort where they had not been given before Rookes was decided. 
The combined result of Rookes and Cassell was devastating.  Until 
2001, punitive damages were effectively limited to two cases.  With 
respect to public authority malpractice, the vast majority of the decisions 
(though not quite all) in practice concerned police misconduct or 
brutality.  As for torts committed with a view to ultimate profit, subject 
to very rare exceptions,21 this was only applied to cases of libel, where 
defendants hoped that the gain from a successful book or a spectacular 
press scoop would exceed the somewhat unpredictable award of 
compensatory damages by a jury.22  And even in these limited cases, 
punitive awards came under some scrutiny regarding their amount.  As it 
happens, both the above situations come within the rare cases where the 
civil jury remains in England;23 and in the 1990s the courts24 and 
Parliament25 took a highly active role in causing the reduction of awards 
that could be regarded as disproportionate.26 
Rookes, as interpreted in Cassell, might have effectively corralled 
punitive awards and brought them under tight control, but little more 
could be said in its favor.  The decision put English law entirely out of 
kilter not only with U.S. developments, but also with Commonwealth 
jurisdictions and Ireland, which nearly all declined to follow it and 
continued to adopt the older, more expansive view.27  Moreover, the 
means chosen to constrain punitive awards were, to say the least, curious.  
The “cause of action” limitation inferred by Cassell meant that the 
 
 21. One such was Guppys (Bridport) Ltd. v. Brookling, 14 H.L.R. 1, 32 (Eng. C.A. 1983) (nuisance committed by lessor with intent to remove rent controlled tenant and get clear title).  22. The classic case was Cassell, [1972] A.C. at 1050–51, concerning the publication of a patently libelous bestseller about the PQ17 convoy disaster in World War II.  23. Under Section 69 of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, jury trial is available as of right in cases of libel, slander, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and (at the instance of the defendant only) in cases of fraud.  Elsewhere there is power in the court to allow jury trial, but in practice it is never exercised.  Supreme Court Act, 1981, s. 69 (Eng.). 
 24. See, e.g., John v. MGN Ltd., [1997] Q.B. 586, 626 (Eng. C.A. 1995) (striking down very large punitive award for an inaccurate article about alleged curious eating habits of rock star Elton John).  25. See Section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, for the first time allowing appeal courts to substitute their own figure for a jury award thought to be excessive rather than to simply empanel another jury.  26. This is discussed further infra pages 1570-72.  27. Canada: Vorvis v. Ins. Corp., [1989] 58 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 206.  Australia: Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, 122–23, aff’d sub nom. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, [1969] 1 A.C. 590, 615 (P.C. 1967).  New Zealand: Taylor v. Beere [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 81, 87 (C.A.).  The Republic of Ireland later followed suit: Conway v. Ir. Nat’l Teachers’ Org., [1991] 11 I.L.R.M. 497, 507 (S.C.). 
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availability of such damages depended arbitrarily on the accidents of 
pre-1963 litigation in England.28  It also, significantly, excluded them 
entirely in two important areas where they might be thought eminently 
appropriate: personal injury and wrongful death (except, to pile anomaly 
on anomaly, where there had been an assault),29 and environmental 
torts.30  Furthermore, it was difficult to see much logic in the view that 
torts committed by nongovernmental entities, however outrageous, could 
not attract punitive damages unless committed specifically with a view 
to profits exceeding damages. 
The Law Commission took these points in 1997 in a report that called 
for the abolition of both the limitations laid down in Rookes and Cassell, 
and advocated legislation to provide general jurisdiction to give punitive 
damages for any wrong (other than a breach of contract) where there was 
shown to have been a deliberate and outrageous disregard of the 
plaintiff’s rights.31  The report itself, as is the way with such things, 
gathered dust.  But the courts then intervened.  The problems of the “cause 
of action” test in Rookes and Cassell were faced head on by the House of 
Lords in Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary.32  
There it was alleged that an unscrupulous (or perhaps idle) police 
officer, faced with a troublesome complaint of theft made by a member 
of the public, had taken the easy way out by forging a document 
withdrawing it.  If proved, this conduct amounted to the tort of misfeasance 
in public office—a tort that had never been the subject of a punitive 
award before Rookes.  An action for damages, including punitive 
damages, ensued.  The lower courts, following Rookes, struck the claim 
for punitive damages, but the House of Lords reinstated it, decisively 
rejecting for these purposes any arbitrary cause of action categorization. 
As a result of Kuddus, the “cause of action” limitation in Cassell has 
now gone.  Since the claim in Kuddus was in respect of police (that is, 
governmental) malpractice, there was no need to decide whether Lord 
Devlin’s other Rookes limitation of punitive awards—namely, that 
 
 28. To take a particularly striking example, there could be a punitive award for trespass to goods, but not conversion of them, because no case concerning the latter had ever come before the English courts.  29. Because assault was a tort where punitive damages had been given pre-1963. 
 30. See A.B. v. S. W. Water Servs. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 507, 514–15 (Eng. C.A. 1992) (negligent metallic poisoning of domestic water supply).  31. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, 107–08.  32. [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L. 2001). 
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against nongovernmental entities they were limited to “profitable” 
torts—should also disappear.  But at least one Law Lord in Kuddus 
clearly thought it should, on the basis that it made no more sense than 
the cause of action test.33  It seems a racing certainty that this latter view 
will prevail; certainly, since the decision in Kuddus courts have thought 
the point arguable enough to avoid summary judgment against a plaintiff 
on it.  Thus in the high profile litigation34 over illicit photographs 
allegedly taken of Catherine Zeta-Jones’s New York nuptials and 
subsequently published in a European celebrity magazine, Vice-
Chancellor Morritt recently declined to strike a claim for punitive 
damages for civil conspiracy and breach of confidence against the 
magazine concerned.35 
II.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
After Kuddus and in the light of subsequent developments, two things 
seem clear. 
First, punitive damages are here to stay in England.  Some may regard 
this as unfortunate.  There remain convincing arguments, both practical 
and theoretical, against the punitive principle as such: that it confuses 
civil and criminal law, that it leads to undeserved windfalls for plaintiffs, 
and so on.36  Indeed, these considerations perhaps deserve more weight 
in the English context.  At least two of the American arguments in 
favor—the need to make sure that plaintiffs get disability insurance 
 
 33.  [T]he availability of exemplary damages should be co-extensive with its rationale.  As already indicated, the underlying rationale lies in the sense of outrage which a defendant’s conduct sometimes evokes, a sense not always assuaged fully by a compensatory award of damages, even when the damages are increased to reflect emotional distress.       . . . .       . . . There is no obvious reason why, if exemplary damages are to be available, the profit motive should suffice but a malicious motive should not. 
Id. at 145 (Lord Nicholls). 
 34. See Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3), [2003] E.M.L.R. 29, 601.  But it must be admitted that at least one case in the lower courts has continued to apply the limitation.  British Midland Tool Ltd. v. Midland Int’l Tooling Ltd., [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 523, 601 (Ch.).  In the most recent post-Kuddus case giving punitive damages against a nongovernmental defendant the point did not arise because there was an intent to profit.  
See Design Progression Ltd. v. Thurloe Prop. Ltd., No. HC02C03752, 2004 WL 62240 (Ch. 2004) (discussing lessor’s bad faith refusal in breach of statute to allow assignment of lease with a view to recovering property unencumbered with lease obligation).  35. To complete the story, at a subsequent hearing Justice Lindsay held that even if exemplary damages were available, this was not a case for their award.  Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 5), [2003] E.M.L.R. 31, 641, 733.  36. The arguments are very well presented in the English context in Allan Beever, 
The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (2003). 
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payouts without excessive argument, and the perception that plaintiffs 
should get back their attorney’s fees—do not really apply in England, 
where private disability insurance is less important as a source of 
compensation, and successful plaintiffs recover their legal costs anyway 
as a matter of course.37  There is also a further point which is sometimes 
missed: England, unlike most states in the United States, has an 
additional category of “aggravated damages.”  This allows damages to 
be augmented where a tort is committed in particularly humiliating or 
distressing circumstances.38  But damages of this sort are essentially 
compensatory in approach, intended to take account of the additional 
loss of dignity or amour propre on the plaintiff’s part.39  Nonetheless, 
for better or worse, the illogic in the Rookes compromise has been 
irretrievably resolved by extending the punitive principle and attempting 
to put it on a logical basis, rather than by abolition.  The elimination of 
punitive damages, whatever its attractions, must be regarded as a lost 
cause. 
Secondly, assuming there is no longer a need for nongovernmental 
defendants to have acted for profit, English law now has a relatively 
clean slate on which to write.  What will be the precise basis of liability 
to punitive damages is not clear, but it is a fair inference that the test is 
likely to be one of outrageous or egregious wrongdoing or something 
similar, as has always been the case in the other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions.40 
If this is right, there are a number of specific points, both principled 
 
 37. So much so that at least one state, Connecticut, limits punitive damages to attorney fees.  See, e.g., Vogel v. Sylvester, 174 A.2d 122, 126 (Conn. 1961).  38. The distinction between aggravated and punitive damages is well explained in Beever, supra note 36.  See also TETTENBORN ET AL., THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 2.20–.23 (Butterworths 2003).  39. Aggravated damages are extra compensation to a plaintiff for injury to his  feelings and dignity caused by the manner in which the defendant acted.  Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are damages which, in certain instances only, are allowed to punish a defendant for his conduct in inflicting the harm complained of.  Huljich v. Hall [1973] 2 N.Z.L.R. 279, 287.  The idea that such damages compensate for injured feelings is confirmed by the suggestion in Khodaparast v. Shad, [2000] 1 All E.R. 545, 556 (C.A. 1999), that corporations, having no feelings to hurt, cannot claim them. 
 40. See, e.g., McLaren Transp. Ltd. v. Somerville [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 424, 434 (“[A]n outrageous and flagrant disregard for the plaintiff’s safety, meriting condemnation and punishment.”).  For a similar formulation, see A. v. Bottrill, [2003] 1 A.C. 449, 455 (P.C. 2002) (involving a decision of the Privy Council in a medical malpractice case on appeal from New Zealand). 
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and practical, that we in England will now have to address.  The rest of 
this paper aims to provide some pointers to the issues that are likely to 
arise. 
III.  THE CRITERIA FOR AN AWARD 
Although the post-Kuddus test for punitive damages is unlikely to 
raise too much difficulty in the round, the devil is (as always) in the 
detail.  Two awkward matters immediately come to mind. 
The first concerns the place of punitive damages in negligence and the 
other inadvertent torts, such as environmental liability.  Since Kuddus, 
there is no doubt that punitive damages are available on principle in all 
such cases, always assuming of course that the plaintiff manages to show 
some sufficiently crass or outrageous dereliction of duty.  So it is not 
unlikely that we shall see fairly soon an English analogue of the 
notorious Ford Pinto41 or Dalkon Shield42 product liability cases, or a 
successful punitive claim for outrageous professional malpractice (for 
example, a lawyer or accountant consistently failing to take elementary 
steps to appear or to protect his client’s interest).  At this point, however, 
English lawyers will have to address a problem that still bedevils U.S. 
commentators: namely, what degree of negligence ought to be required?  
In particular, should there be any need for subjective wrongdoing or 
knowing risk taking, as held in the majority of U.S. state courts,43 or 
should it equally be sufficient to show a very high degree of 
foolishness?44  The Law Commission in 1997 clearly preferred the former, 
subjective approach.  Under its recommendations, punitive damages 
would be specifically limited to cases where the defendant had showed a 
“deliberate and outrageous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.”45  But this 
is not the end of the matter.  The Commission did not discuss this point 
in any particular detail, no doubt because it thought that the distinction 
was unlikely to be very significant in practice anyway.  Punitive damages 
are, after all, inevitably limited to very serious cases of negligence; and in 
 
 41. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358–60 (Ct. App. 1981).  42. For one major decision in this saga, which is still continuing, see Tetuan v. 
A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1246 (Kan. 1987). 
 43. See, e.g., Nat’l By-Prods., Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co., 731 S.W.2d 194, 196–97 (Ark. 1987); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1984).  Section 908 of the Second Restatement of Torts is to similar effect, demanding conduct that is “outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).  44. A standard adhered to by a minority of state courts, such as those of Kansas.  
See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988).  45. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, at 2. 
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the vast majority of such cases—patently lethal products, outrageous 
professional malpractice, and so on—the very negligent defendant will 
almost certainly have had some idea of the risk he was taking, if not of 
its illegitimacy, and hence be amenable to a finding of deliberate or 
reckless wrongdoing.  As luck would have it, however, a genuine case of 
serious but entirely inadvertent wrongdoing did arise in 2002 in the 
Privy Council,46 on an appeal from New Zealand (whose law is, since 
Kuddus, potentially very relevant to that of England).  A. v. Bottrill 
involved a medical malpractice suit arising from gross misreadings of 
cervical smears.47  The defendant physician was specifically found not to 
have been guilty of knowing or even reckless wrongdoing, but merely to 
have been extremely culpable.  The trial court gave punitive damages; 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal reversed.48  Restoring the judgment of 
the trial court and rejecting the Law Commission’s more limited view, 
the Privy Council upheld the award of punitive damages. 
With respect, it is suggested that in this respect the Privy Council was 
right and the Law Commission was wrong.  True, it is, and should be, 
easier to penalize knowing than inadvertent behavior.  Only in fairly 
exceptional cases should mere stupidity give rise to a punitive award.  
Nevertheless, assuming that the law of civil damages does have a part to 
play in penalizing egregious conduct, there seems no reason a priori to 
exclude inadvertent wrongdoing entirely from its effect, any more than 
from the effect of the criminal law. 
Secondly, there is the question of the present status of torts committed 
for gain, that is, where the defendant knew what he was doing was 
wrongful, but calculated that the lucre accruing to him would exceed any 
payout to the plaintiff.  Under the pre-Kuddus regime this was, of 
course, a prerequisite for any claim at all against a nongovernmental 
defendant.  But it was also the case in practice that if the necessary intent 
was shown then the jury would be instructed almost as of course to 
 
 46. The Privy Council, staffed largely by English judges, still hears appeals from a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions.  It is one of the ironies of this jurisdiction that English judges may find themselves deciding points of common law principle in a different way from the way they would be determined in England.  This indeed happened in the punitive damages case of Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, aff’d sub nom. Austl. Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, [1969] 1 A.C. 590 (P.C. 1967), heard on appeal from Australia, where the Privy Council endorsed the Australian refusal to follow Rookes.  Yet more ironically, one member of the Privy Council in Uren, Lord Pearce, had actually sat in Rookes and had agreed in the result.  47. A. v. Bottrill, [2003] 1 A.C. 449, 452–53 (P.C. 2002).  48. Bottrill v. A. [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 622. 
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consider a punitive award.  In other words, the calculation of gain was, 
practically speaking, often regarded as not only necessary but sufficient.  
It is suggested, however, that this latter rule may now be open to 
reconsideration.  The general criterion of outrageous or flagrant behavior 
ought presumably to be all embracing and exclusive.  Only to the extent 
that the intent to make a gain is an indication of behavior that merits 
punishment over and above compensatory damages should there be any 
question of a punitive award.  Indeed, there is also a further reason to 
abandon the idea that a profit motive should suffice as such.  Since the 
decision in Rookes in 1963, there have been further developments which 
have made it largely redundant.  To begin with, the idea of restitution for 
wrongs has been put on a firm footing in England,49 and there is now 
considerable learning on when gains made as a result of the commission 
of a wrong against the plaintiff fail to be disgorged on that basis.50  
Furthermore, in the law of damages itself it is now recognized that in 
certain, fairly closely defined, circumstances a nonpunitive award can be 
made based not on the loss to the plaintiff but on the profit or gain made 
by the defendant as a result of the wrong.51  In these circumstances, it is 
highly arguable that where the plaintiff wishes a remedy based 
specifically on the profit allegedly made by the defendant, this should be 
regarded as outside the law of punitive damages.52  The job can now be 
done by other parts of the law.  The law on punitive damages should be 
left to concentrate on its proper rationale, namely the penalization of 
seriously unacceptable conduct. 
 
 49. It is worth noting that Goff and Jones’ The Law of Restitution, the first systematic treatment of the subject in England, was first published only in 1966, some three years after Rookes. 
 50. See ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 455–91 (2d ed. 2002).  
Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L. 2000), almost a carbon copy of 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514–16 (1980), is a striking recent example.  51. For example, where a defendant profits from trespassory activities on or under land, such as mining coal or unlawfully transporting his own goods across it, an award of compensatory damages may be made on the basis of that profit.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Homfray, 6 L.R.-Ch. 770 (1871); Jaggard v. Sawyer, [1995] 2 All E.R. 189, 190 (C.A. 1994).  This, of course, reflects developments in the United States.  See, for example, the classic Kentucky decision in Edwards v. Lee’s Administrator, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936).  52. Persuasively argued in the Anglo-Canadian context in Jeff Berryman, The 
Case for Restitutionary Damages over Punitive Damages: Teaching the Wrongdoer that 
Tort Does Not Pay, 73 CAN. BAR REV. 320, 321 (1994).  See also Gail Heriot, Civilizing 
Punitive Damages: Lessons From Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 880 (2003) (arguing that punitive damages should be equated with restitution). 
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IV.   PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?53 
Whether there can, or should, be punitive damages for breach of 
contract has always been an awkward topic.54  On the face of it, 
American authority is overwhelmingly negative.55  However, all is not as 
it seems.  Where a contract is tainted with fraud on the defendant’s part, 
some courts have allowed punitive awards.56  Moreover, there is massive 
authority that bad faith breach may engender punitive damages, notably 
where insurance carriers have declined to make payments plainly due.57  
Admittedly, this is normally done on the basis that bad faith breach, or 
breach of a contractual duty of loyalty and good faith, gives rise to tort 
liability.58  But it is difficult to resist the conclusion that this is simply a 
piece of definitional sleight of hand, and that, in effect if not in name, 
certain well-defined categories of contract breach do give rise to a 
potential right to punitive damages. 
With respect to English case law, before Kuddus there was no doubt 
on the matter: punitive damages were limited to tort, and breach of 
 
 53. See the instructive articles in Leslie E. John, Formulating Standards for 
Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2036 (1986) (arguing that the standard for awarding punitive damages should be the defendant’s departure from commercially acceptable norms); William S. Dodge, The 
Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing that economic efficiency supports the awarding of punitive damages in some breach of contract cases); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 55 (2003) (analyzing the English and Canadian cases).  54. This leaves aside cases where the same fact situation gives rise to both tortious and contractual liability.  Here there seems no reason, on either side of the Atlantic, why there should not be punitive damages. 
 55. See, e.g., 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8 (2d ed. 1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
 56. See, e.g., Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 1999) (involving agreement to sell land in Iowa entered into fraudulently with knowledge that it could not be carried out).  A similar case is Suffolk Sports Center, Inc. v. Belli Construction Corp., 628 N.Y.S.2d 952 (App. Div. 1995), involving a breach by the lessor of covenants in the lease with the sole intent of forcing the lessee out. 
 57. See STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIABILITY § 2:05 (1987); Richard B. Graves III, Comment, Bad-Faith Denial of Insurance Claims: Whose Faith, Whose 
Punishment? An Examination of Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 395, 402–03 (1990).  58. The impetus for this development came from such cases as Comunale v. 
Traders & General Insurance Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958), identifying an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  But there has been reluctance to extend the theory beyond insurance.  See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 670 (Cal. 1995) (rejecting a tort based on the bad faith denial of a contract’s existence). 
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contract could not give rise to them.59  Since that case the matter must be 
regarded as less certain, however.60  Moreover, the matter has received a 
further airing as a result of the Canadian decision in Whiten v. Pilot 
Insurance Co.61  There the Canadian Supreme Court upheld a punitive 
award in a bad faith nonpayment suit against an insurance carrier, 
despite the fact that it regarded the claim as contractual and not, as it 
would have been in most U.S. states, tortious.  The potential effect of 
this case is considerable in England, where there is no tort of bad faith 
breach of contract. 
If there is no longer any necessary bar to punitive breach of contract 
awards, the question becomes one of policy: Ought English law to 
recognize them, and if so, when?  The Law Commission, which thought 
at some length about the matter, thought they should not be available at 
all.  In summary, they argued that such damages had never previously 
been awarded, that contract damages were largely about pecuniary losses 
and that punitive awards were less appropriate in such cases, that 
punitive damages would compromise contractual certainty, that contracts 
were negotiated arrangements whereas there was no possibility for prior 
negotiation in a tort situation, and finally, that punitive damages would 
discourage efficient breach.62  To these there might be added a further 
point: punitive damages are outside any normal conception of corrective 
justice, which is normally the subject matter of contract actions.63 
It is tentatively suggested, however, that these arguments are less 
convincing than they look.  To take the last first, while punitive damages 
are indeed not a part of corrective justice there is (it is submitted) no 
necessary reason why the function of contract damages should be strictly 
limited to achieving corrective justice.  We live in an untidy legal world, 
and an absolute bar on punitive ideas in contract is certainly not self-
evidently justified.  The Law Commission’s reasoning is also open to a 
number of objections.  The fact that there have never been such awards 
in the past is beside the point, particularly since the thrust of the Law 
Commission’s recommendations elsewhere was to discountenance the 
holding in Rookes that punitive awards should be limited to where they 
 
 59. Perera v. Vandiyar, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 672 (C.A.).  60. It is a question of some nicety in England, since the apparent bar on contractual punitive awards in Perera v. Vandiyar, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 672, predates Rookes 
v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.) and Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027 (H.L.).  It could therefore be argued that Kuddus, being concerned merely with the “cause of action” categorization in Rookes, has not removed it.  It all depends on how widely the decision in Kuddus is read.  61. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595.  62. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, at 118.  63. Weinrib, supra note 53, at 84–102. 
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had previously been given.  As for the others, they seem predicated on 
the idea that in a case concerning, for example, breach of a commodity 
sales agreement or wrongful withdrawal of a ship under charter, damages 
should be fairly strictly limited to the actual loss suffered by the 
plaintiff.  In particular, the circumstances of the breach, or the motives 
of the contract breaker, should not affect them.64  Here the argument is 
indeed attractive: economic efficiency and commercial expectations do 
suggest that damages should be limited to actual proved loss.  But there 
is no reason to think that these considerations necessarily apply to all 
contracts, or even all commercial contracts.  Take the consumer context, for 
example where there is a gross and cynical failure to provide a 
contracted after-sales service on durable goods such as computers.  Here 
there is much to be said for at least the possibility of a punitive award.  
The fact that the loss can be categorized as financial, or that theoretically 
the terms of the contract were open to negotiation, does not seem 
particularly relevant; and there can be no serious argument that this is the 
sort of efficient breach that ought to be encouraged.  Again, it is perfectly 
possible to think of examples in commercial law, for example where a 
franchisor in blatant breach of contract fails to perform its part of the 
agreement by way of advertising and product support.65  If the breach is 
sufficiently egregious, there seems no reason on principle why a punitive 
award should be impossible.  Certainly none of the arguments raised by the 
Law Commission raises a very strong case against it.  Yet another 
example might arise from legal malpractice.  Most malpractice suits can 
be brought in the tort of negligence, where since Kuddus there seems no 
doubt that punitive damages are available on principle.  But not all suits 
necessarily lie in tort.  Suppose a lawyer is instructed at a late stage, at a 
time when no other lawyer can be found, to make a vital appearance at a 
hearing but fails to do so in circumstances showing an outrageous breach 
of duty.  Here arguably the only cause of action is contract;66 it would be 
 
 64. In a similar vein, English courts, like those in the United States, have resisted the temptation to look to the profits made from the breach and to award restitution.  See, 
e.g., Occidental Worldwide Inv. Corp. v. Skibs A/S Avanti, [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 293, 337 (Q.B. 1975) (rejecting profits as measure of damages for withdrawal of ship under charter); Univ. of Nottingham v. Fishel, [2000] I.C.R. 1462 (Q.B.) (university professor moonlighting in breach of contract).  65. A situation where, in many U.S. jurisdictions, an award would be available by reference to breach of the implied (semitortious) covenant of good faith.  66. There is no element of reliance by the client.  If the lawyer had not taken the case, no one else could have been found who would have been able to. 
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odd if, for that reason alone, punitive damages were barred. 
If there is a place for punitive damages in the law of contract, what 
kinds of breach should be regarded as sufficiently outrageous and 
inexcusable to attract them?  The question is an awkward one.  The idea 
of transplanting the widespread American concept of “bad faith” breach 
is not propitious, if only because English contract law has no coherent 
concept of contractual good faith in general, and for that matter no 
discrete duty of good faith and fair dealing in performance either.67  Nor, 
unless we wish to see all avoidable breaches of sales contracts 
transformed into potential punitive damages suits, can it be enough that 
the breach is deliberate, unjustified, or opportunistic.  Absent any further 
guide, however, arguably a breach should be taken as outrageous enough 
if it satisfies one or more of three criteria.  The first is where, although 
there may not have been any positive misrepresentation by the 
defendant, the defendant knew when contracting that he would almost 
certainly be unable to perform.68  This is so near to tortious fraud that it 
ought to be treated no differently.  The second, which might perhaps 
approximate most closely to the American “bad faith breach” cases, is 
where: (a) the breach related to the defendant’s reliance interest; (b) to 
the defendant’s knowledge the breach was likely to cause the plaintiff 
substantial danger, distress, or consequential loss; and (c) there was no 
mitigating factor, such as that the defendant needed to save himself from 
financial meltdown or had two customers for given goods or services but 
could only satisfy one.  The third is where the contract embodies a duty 
equivalent, or very nearly equivalent, to a fiduciary duty and the breach 
of that duty was deliberate.69  A straightforward example would be a company officer’s misuse of corporate opportunity which gained him 
nothing but only caused moderate actual loss to the corporation concerned.  
Apart from these, there is the case of professional misconduct.  As 
pointed out above, contractual and tort claims in this regard are so 
closely intertwined that it seems foolish to draw a bright line between 
them. 
 
 67. See, e.g., Ewan McKendrick, Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?, in GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT AND PROPERTY 39, 39–40 (A.D.M. Forte ed., 1999).  The lack of any English analog to Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 is one of the striking differences between U.S. and English commercial law.  68. For example, where a franchisor induces a customer to sink money into a business that the franchisor knows he cannot service properly, or for that matter where a seller of goods provides a guarantee of future service which he knows he is extremely unlikely to be able to meet.  69. This distinction is not unknown to English contract law.  Thus it has been held that breach of such a term may, exceptionally, allow the plaintiff to claim gain-based rather than loss-based damages.  See generally CMS Dolphin Ltd. v. Simonet [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 704 (Ch.). 
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V.  PUBLIC DEFENDANTS 
Before the liberalization in Kuddus, in some respects the English 
position on punitive damages provided a curious photographic negative 
image of that obtaining in most U.S. states.  The availability of punitive 
damages against private defendants was severely limited, applying only 
to torts committed for gain, and even there being limited almost entirely 
to libel in practice.  But awards against governmental entities, particularly 
police departments, flourished.  In the United States, by contrast, the 
private law action has burgeoned while punitive awards against public 
authorities are comparatively rare.  Indeed, there is Supreme Court authority 
that, in the federal jurisdiction, municipalities and other public bodies 
are not amenable to punitive awards absent statutory warrant,70 and for 
good measure a number of states specifically prohibit them by statute.71 
The reason for the American distaste for punitive damages against public 
bodies is straightforward.  As Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun put 
it in the civil rights case of City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,72 
awards of this sort tend to “burden the very taxpayers and citizens for 
whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised.”  Public bodies have 
limited funds available to carry out their duties, and however strong the 
claim of those suffering damage as a result of maladministration, every 
dollar (or pound) paid out by way of punitive damages reduces the 
amount available for its legitimate purposes. 
This issue has never been met head on by the English courts.  They 
have simply accepted that public bodies, like other employers, are 
vicariously liable for the torts of their employees, and that insofar as the 
employee is amenable to punitive damages so also is the employer 
(though, to be fair, it is now the practice piously to warn juries 
contemplating punitive awards against governmental bodies of the 
possible effect on services provided by those bodies).73  Perhaps 
surprisingly, the Law Commission’s 1997 report, which otherwise 
 
 70. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981); see also Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 2001); Robert J. Baccari, Note, 
Governmental Immunity—Pennsylvania Taxpayers No Longer Protected from Police 
Brutality—Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994), 68 TEMP. L. REV. 977, 978 (1995) (attacking a rare case going the other way). 
 71. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:4 (1997).  72. 453 U.S. at 263. 
 73. See Thompson v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498, 513–17 (C.A. 1997). 
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looked at the issue of principle fairly closely, never chose to discuss 
whether special rules ought to apply to governmental defendants. 
But, if we do have a relatively clean slate on which to write, there is 
much to be said for English courts adopting a radical solution and going 
at least some way toward the American position.  As a matter of 
principle, punishing taxpayers for the sins of public servants is difficult 
to justify.  In this respect they are essentially different from stockholders 
in a private corporation, who have at least chosen to invest in it and to 
that extent to ally their fortunes with those of the corporation itself.  
Moreover, even on a purely instrumental basis, it is a little hard to see 
what we gain by diverting funds from public services to a relatively 
undeserving plaintiff.74  The argument that county treasurers, or for that 
matter taxpayers, will thereby be encouraged to exercise more control 
over what is done in their name seems, to say the least, far fetched.  Nor 
does there seem much to be said, even in civil rights suits, for the 
symbolic value of massive awards against taxpayers generally.75  True, 
very occasionally there may be a case where an award will not increase 
the tax burden overall—for instance, where the governmental defendant 
has actually gained from its wrong and the punitive damages award does 
not exceed this gain76—but such exceptional situations aside, it is 
suggested that there is hardly ever any convincing justification for a 
punitive award against a local or other authority. 
VI.  LIABILITY: WHOSE KNOWLEDGE OR OUTRAGEOUSNESS                    
OUGHT TO BE IN ACCOUNT? 
Except for specialized cases such as awards in traffic accident cases, 
acts potentially giving rise to punitive damages are almost invariably 
 
 74. A specific English illustration would be medical malpractice where medical services are provided by the state under the National Health Service.  Underfunded as the National Health Service is, the position would hardly be improved were it to be hit by regular awards of punitive damages against individual health authorities.  If this did happen, there is little doubt that legislative intervention would swiftly follow.  75. Hence the fact that a civil rights suit is involved has not generally persuaded U.S. courts to give punitive awards against municipalities and others.  City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263–64; Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989); Evans v. Port Auth., 273 F.3d 346, 356 (3d Cir. 2001).  76. For example, where a municipality outrageously breaks its duty to provide for an indigent who then dies, there is a case for an award limited to the amount that the municipality saved.  Compare, in a slightly different context, Cook County v. United 
States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003).  In this case, one reason why the Supreme Court allowed punitive damages against a municipality under the False Claims Act at the suit of the federal government was that the taxpayers had actually benefited from the original overpayment.  “This very case,” wrote Justice Souter, “shows how FCA liability may expose only local taxpayers who have already enjoyed the indirect benefit of the fraud . . . .”  Id. at 132. 
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committed by those working for corporations, institutions, or government.  
This immediately raises an acute problem of principle.  Should the 
employer be liable, as it is for compensatory damages, on the simple 
basis of vicarious liability, that is, without considering its personal 
blameworthiness (if any)?  Or should the decision on whether to make 
an award, and if so of how much, be based on the blameworthiness of 
the person being sued? 
Hitherto the English approach has been to take the former position, 
though to be fair the point has largely gone by default.77  Thus police 
commissioners and government departments have been regularly held 
liable to pay punitive damages in respect of brutality by, for example, 
police and prison officers, despite the lack of any indication that as 
employers they condoned, or connived at, these actions, or even that 
they failed to take reasonable steps to prevent them.  By contrast, the 
tendency in the United States is toward the second position, in 
demanding at least some degree of fault in the employer.  Thus, in 
Kolstad v. American Dental Association, the Supreme Court held that, in 
employment discrimination suits, the employer would not be liable to 
punitive damages merely because a supervisor employed by it satisfied 
the necessary criteria under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78  
At a minimum, an employer who had taken all reasonable means to 
avoid the acts complained of should be free of noncompensatory 
liability.  A number of States have code provisions to similar effect79 or 
have reached the same result by judicial decision;80 and indeed it is 
stated in the Restatement Second of Torts that it is “improper . . . to 
award punitive damages against one who himself is personally innocent 
and therefore liable only vicariously.”81 
Logically, it is suggested that the second position—that there must be 
some fault in the employer personally—is the only defensible one.  
Punitive damages are there to punish for egregious conduct, not to 
compensate for loss; it is entirely inconsistent with this rationale to 
 
 77. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, 158–59.  78. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544–45 (1999).  This cemented an earlier trend.  See Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 79. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-27(a) (1993). 
 80. See, e.g., White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 951 (Cal. 1999) (interpreting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b)).  81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909, cmt. b (1979). 
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impose a penal sanction on a given defendant independently of the 
blameworthiness of that defendant.  The counterargument that punishing 
an innocent employer will encourage him to take steps to rein in 
maverick employees in future82 cannot, it is suggested, hold water; it has 
the same validity, and fairness, as the action of the British Crown when 
it had Admiral Byng executed merely pour encourager les autres.83  Nor 
is there any real substance in the argument that the employer ought to be 
liable because it is easier to collect from an employer than an employee.  
Whatever the social need to ensure that compensation is actually 
received, no such need applies to a windfall punitive award. 
In England, the merits of the second view have belatedly received 
some recognition. In Kuddus,84 three out of five Law Lords85 found it 
curious that vicarious liability applied without modification to punitive 
damages, and only one showed any enthusiasm for the rule.86  This may 
presage a change of approach, and it is to be hoped that it does.87  But 
the omens are not good.  The English practice is well established, and 
the Law Commission in its Report was strongly in favor of its 
continuance,88 mainly on the basis of the two somewhat weak arguments 
outlined above. 
VII.  JUDGE AND JURY 
Despite the fact that the civil jury has largely disappeared in England, 
bench trials being the norm, by a quirk of fate the vast majority of 
punitive damage awards have been jury awards.  This was because under 
the pre-Kuddus rules nearly all such trials in practice involved either 
police malpractice or libel, and in cases of assault, false imprisonment, 
 
 82. See generally Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and 
the Limits of Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799 (2000).  83. Admiral John Byng had bravely but unsuccessfully attempted to defend Minorca from an attack by French forces in 1756 during the Seven Years’ War.  Despite his lack of blame, he was court-martialed and shot in 1757 as an example to other commanders.  The quote is from Voltaire in Candide (“dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer 
de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres”).  VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 125 (J.H. Brumfitt ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (1759).  84. Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L. 2001). 
 85. Id. at 140–41 (Lord Mackay); id. at 144–45 (Lord Nicholls); id. at 156–57 (Lord Scott). 
 86. Id. at 149 (Lord Hutton).  87. This approach has, perhaps significantly, been accepted in New Zealand.  See S. v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 450, paras. 86–89, 94–95 (considering the doubts expressed in Kuddus).  88. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, at 158–61. 
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and libel it continues to be the law that jury trial is available as of right.89 
Although jury determinations of punitive damages are almost universal in 
the United States, not least because of the Seventh Amendment, in 
England the prevalence of the jury in this area has caused some disquiet.  
As a result, in its 1997 Report, the Law Commission expressed the very 
strong view that the law should be changed so that in the future, even where 
the actual trial on liability and (nonpunitive) damages was by jury, all 
questions of punitive damages—both whether they should be awarded at all, 
and if so how much—should be decided by the judge alone.90  The 
reasoning of the Law Commission was essentially that, though punitive 
damages were a desirable part of the courts’ armory, awards should 
show both moderation and consistency; and that juries could not be 
trusted to provide either.  In addition, it felt that the duty of a judge to 
give reasons for his or her decisions would make appellate control a 
good deal easier. 
With respect, for all its plausibility this is not an easy view to accept.  
There are, of course, perfectly respectable grounds for simply abolishing 
the civil jury, and indeed the thrust of the Law Commission’s reasoning 
would appear to apply to jury trial as a whole.  But because the 
Commission accepted that juries would remain to decide nonpunitive 
damages in some cases (for example, police malpractice), the question is 
whether they are any less suitable to determine punitive awards.  This 
seems doubtful.  Take a classic case of litigation over incommensurables, a 
libel suit.  One reason why juries are still allowed in such cases in 
England is that a jury is seen as best equipped to determine the merit of 
the plaintiff, that is, how much should she receive in compensation for a 
smirched reputation?  But if so, why is the same jury not just as fitted to 
decide the demerit of the defendant: that is, how badly he has behaved, 
and how much, if anything, he should pay by way of punishment?  
Indeed, if anything, punitive damages would seem an even better bet for 
decision by juries than other forms of compensation.  No awkward 
questions of calculation or valuation arise, as they do in (say) personal 
injury compensation.  More importantly, prospects for standardization—one 
of the supposed advantages of bench trial—seem remarkably limited, since 
degrees of culpability and other matters are likely to vary enormously.  For 
the same reason, the scope for control by appeal courts seems pretty 
 
 89. Supreme Court Act, 1981, s. 69 (Eng.).  90. AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 4, at 124. 
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limited.  In short, it is highly arguable that punitive damages deal 
largely in matters of moral and community judgment, where it is by 
no means clear what are the advantages of bench trial over jury 
determination.91 
VIII.  THE SIZE OF PUNITIVE AWARDS 
There is no doubt that the amount of punitive awards has the potential 
to cause disquiet.  Punitive damages, after all, have for a long time been 
one of the main targets of the tort reform movement in the United States.  
A number of states, fazed by some very large and high profile awards, 
have legislated to control the sums awarded.92  Most such controls take 
the form of a reference to a multiple of the actual damages, and many 
also apply an overall limit.93  In addition to state controls, there may be 
constitutional implications.  Thus two high profile Supreme Court cases 
have struck down very large punitive awards on due process grounds,94 
and in the later of them it was suggested that it would be difficult for a 
ratio between actual and punitive damages in more than single figures to 
pass muster. 
Since the 1980s, there have been parallel English developments, 
though they have taken a rather different and more fluid form.  Thus it 
has been made clear by the Court of Appeal that juries must be 
instructed to, and a judge in a bench trial must, award merely the 
minimum necessary to punish the defendant.95  It is also clear that 
account must be taken of the defendant’s means96 and any circumstance 
 
 91. I leave aside the practical inconvenience and expense of having in effect two trials, the first (jury) to decide liability and compensatory damages and the second (bench) to determine any punitive award. 
 92. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.020(f)–(h) (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a–b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2000).  This list is taken from Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in 
Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1015 n.60 (1999).  It is fair to say that many of these controls have been introduced to prevent constitutional challenges. 
 93. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(b) (West Supp. 2003) (three times damages with a $500,000 limit).  94. BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–82 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).  95. John v. MGN Ltd, [1997] Q.B. 586, 619 (C.A. 1995).  96. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1228 (H.L.) (Lord Devlin); Thompson v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498, 503 (C.A. 1997). 
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mitigating his blameworthiness.97  Indeed, various “brackets” have been 
laid down by the Court of Appeal for particular circumstances, which 
apply even in jury trials (and, incidentally, may be made known to a 
jury), 98 though they are not strictly binding and may be departed from in 
extreme circumstances.  Furthermore, Parliament, unconstrained as it is by 
any equivalent to the Seventh Amendment, has also had no difficulty in 
legislating to the effect that that the Court of Appeal may, if it thinks an 
award excessive, substitute its own figure without empanelling another 
jury.99 
Before Kuddus, of course, the task of controlling the amount of punitive 
awards was made easier by the fact that they were only available in a few 
types of cases anyway.  Only relatively simple guidelines were needed.  
Now that such awards are more widely available, however, it may well be 
that the English courts will be forced to move some way towards the 
position in a number of those American states which have legislated on 
the matter, and, at least in cases where there is a substantial amount of 
pecuniary loss, lay down guidelines on what multiples of actual damages 
are likely to be acceptable. 
There is of course no overarching constitutional standard against 
which to measure punitive damages in England.  On the other hand, at 
least two provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which is now incorporated as an English statute100 and informs all 
judgments, may be relevant.  The First Protocol, Article 1, provides that 
“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and 
by the general principles of international law.”101  This obviously has 
affinities with the due process clause, and although there is as yet no 
authority on its impact on the law of damages, it must be arguable that it 
will oblige the courts to constrain very large punitive awards.  Furthermore, 
it should also be remembered that Article 10, the Convention equivalent 
 
 97. Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, [1987] Q.B. 380, 388 (C.A. 1985). 
 98. See, e.g., John, [1997] Q.B. at 596; Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 511.  99. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, s. 8 (Eng.).  It is worth noting, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court managed to reach nearly the same result by saying that punitive damage findings by juries were not findings of fact and then mandating de novo review by appellate courts on that basis.  Cooper Indust., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435–36 (2001).  100. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 22, sched. 1, art. 10 (Eng.). 
 101. Id. at Part II, art. 1. 
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to the First Amendment, has been held to outlaw awards of nonpunitive 
damages in libel where they are so large as to effectively suppress free 
speech on a matter of public concern.102 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
England now has a unique opportunity to formulate a justifiable rule 
on the availability of punitive damages, free from almost all the 
constrictions of precedent which previously bedeviled the area.  
Moreover, the experience in America, where many of the problems have 
already been addressed (even if not necessarily solved), will obviously 
be informative here; in certain circumstances, such as the liability of 
public authorities, the American courts have developed a position which 
deserves serious scrutiny.  On the other hand, a number of caveats are 
necessary.  Even though the doctrine of precedent is not as strong as it 
was in England, English courts are likely to be wary of introducing 
major exceptions to established doctrines by judicial decision.  For 
example, it would almost certainly take a decision of the House of 
Lords, and a radical House of Lords at that, to alter radically the 
established law of vicarious liability so as to distinguish between the 
conduct of an employee and the personal fault of the employer, and to 
award punitive damages only in respect of the latter.  Secondly, the 
recommendations of the Law Commission are likely to carry considerable 
weight in any future development of the law on punitive damages.  
Because at least some of these recommendations—for example, those on 
breach of contract—are a little illogical, it may be that developments 
will not be as wide-ranging as they might otherwise be.  Thirdly, it has to 
be remembered, at least some of the conditions in the U.S. which have led 
to the generous development of punitive damages—for instance the 
irrecoverability of attorney fees, or the extensive reliance on private 
insurance as a source of income for the disabled—do not obtain in 
England.  This may mean that the further development of punitive 
damages is less extensive than one might otherwise expect.  Lastly, there 
is a further intangible feature.  English courts are increasingly looking 
for legal inspiration not to the United States or the Commonwealth, but 
to the other members of the European Union,103 and within the European 
 
 102. See the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Miloslavsky v. 
United Kingdom, 20 EUR. CT. H.R. 442 (1995), castigating a £1.5 million award by an English court in respect of baseless allegations that plaintiff was a war criminal as excessive because of its chilling effect on free speech.  103. Indeed, although the European Union does not have competence over private law per se, it has inspired and encouraged moves towards assimilation of private law in the member states.  See, for example, CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS (1998), a magisterial study spawned by academic discussions taking 
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Union, England, Northern Ireland, and Ireland are the only jurisdictions 
that recognize punitive damages at all.  This may well in time cause the 
courts in England to be more hesitant in advancing the boundaries of 


































place under the aegis of the European Union; and compare Stathis Banakas, European 
Tort Law: Is It Possible?, 10 EUR. REV. PRIVATE LAW 363 (2002), proposing a new common European tort law that is not simply an amalgamation of current national laws. 
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